Multi-unit auctions with complementarities: issues of efficiency in electricity auctions

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2004.01.048MaRDI QIDQ1780752zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wedad J. Elmaghraby

Publication date 13 June 2005

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2004.01.048

zbMATH Keywords

EfficiencyComplementarityElectricityMulti-unit auctionsBundling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Case-oriented studies in operations research (90B90) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions
• Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods
• The multiple unit auction with variable supply
• Revenue and efficiency ranking in large multi-unit and bundle auctions
• On organization of markets of homogeneous goods

Cites work

• A multiple-object auction with superadditive values
• A two stage sequential auction with multi-unit demands
• Auctions of heterogeneous objects
• Computationally manageable combinational auctions
• Equilibria in a multi-object uniform price sealed bid auction with multi- unit demands
• Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices
• Multiple unit auctions with strategic price-quantity decisions

Cited in

(3)

• Complementary bidding mechanisms and startup costs in electricity markets
• Analysis of Quantized Double Auctions with Application to Competitive Electricity Markets
• Design of a combinatorial double auction for local energy markets

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