An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2005.00343.XMaRDI QIDQ5706650zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Motty Perry, Philip J. Reny

Publication date 21 November 2005

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2005.00343.x

zbMATH Keywords

demandsequilibrium strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(32)

• Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents
• Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
• An efficient ascending auction for private valuations
• A preference-based, multi-unit auction for pricing and capacity allocation
• An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals
• Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
• Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge
• Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions
• Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions
• On the strictly descending multi-unit auction
• Reputation in multi-unit ascending auction with common values
• Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders
• Continuous ascending vs. pooled multiple unit auctions
• Ascending auctions for multiple objects: the case for the Japanese design
• Descending price multi-item auctions
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions
• Prompt Mechanism for Online Auctions with Multi-unit Demands
• Auction design for the efficient allocation of service capacity under congestion
• On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts
• The case for multi-unit single-run descending-price auctions
• Properties of the DGS-auction algorithm
• Inefficient rushes in auctions
• An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders
• On the superiority of the multiple round ascending bid auction
• On efficiency of the English auction
• Second best efficiency and the English auction
• An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
• Efficient and strategy-proof multi-unit object allocation problems with money: decreasing incremental valuations with income effects
• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions: a uniqueness result
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• An ascending double auction

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