Auctioning off a non-rivalrous good with interference
In this paper the auctions of non-rivalrous goods with interference are examined. Additionally, collusion in group auctions can result in higher bids if the coalition increases their chance of winning the item by allowing high-value bidders to subsidize the payments of low-value bidders. The results show that group auctions can achieve higher social welfare than individual auctions if the valuations are not too far apart. More precisely, the author examine a uniform price auction over non-conflicting groups and examine how non-rivalry impacts both efficiency and collusion. Conditions are given under which an auction over groups generates higher social welfare than an individual auction. Additional conditions are given under which collusion in a group auction results in higher prices.
- An upper bound for the chromatic number of a graph and its application to timetabling problems
- Bidder collusion
- Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
- Collusion through communication in auctions
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods
- Generalized second price auctions over a network
- Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient
- Two ways to auction off an uncertain good
This page was built for publication: Auctioning off a non-rivalrous good with interference
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q7036075)
