Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
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Publication:1800965
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2018.07.002zbMATH Open1416.91109OpenAlexW2884542524WikidataQ109043142 ScholiaQ109043142MaRDI QIDQ1800965FDOQ1800965
Authors: Foivos Savva 
Publication date: 26 October 2018
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.002
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Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
- Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion
- Motives and implementation: On the design of mechanisms to elicit opinions
- Mechanism design and intentions
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Fault Tolerant Implementation
- A crash course in implementation theory
- A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Implementation with evidence
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Acceptable points in games of perfect information
- Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
- A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- Axiomatic bargaining theory on economic environments
- Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents
- Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Nash implementation and the bargaining problem
- On partially honest Nash implementation in private good economies with restricted domains: a sufficient condition
- Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems
- Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
Cited In (12)
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- Double implementation without no-veto-power
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- Behavioral strong implementation
- Motives and implementation with rights structures
- Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents
- Implementation with a sympathizer
- Weakly implementable social choice rules
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
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