Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
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Recommendations
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Cites work
- A crash course in implementation theory
- A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
- A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
- Acceptable points in games of perfect information
- Axiomatic bargaining theory on economic environments
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
- Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
- Fault Tolerant Implementation
- Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
- Implementation with evidence
- Mechanism design and intentions
- Motives and implementation: On the design of mechanisms to elicit opinions
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Nash implementation and the bargaining problem
- Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
- On partially honest Nash implementation in private good economies with restricted domains: a sufficient condition
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion
Cited in
(12)- Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents
- Behavioral strong implementation
- Motives and implementation with rights structures
- Weakly implementable social choice rules
- Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Implementation with a sympathizer
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Double implementation without no-veto-power
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
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