Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.12.010zbMATH Open1419.91275OpenAlexW2908947494WikidataQ128615858 ScholiaQ128615858MaRDI QIDQ1729675FDOQ1729675

Authors: Saptarshi Mukherjee, Nozomu Muto, Eve Ramaekers, Arunava Sen 

Publication date: 28 February 2019

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.010

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zbMATH Keywords

bounded mechanismsimplementation in undominated strategiesPareto correspondence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. With contributions by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Pure Strategy Dominance
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
• Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games
• Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
• Game theory and mechanism design

Cited In (8)

• Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
• Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
• Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
• Designing rotation programs: limits and possibilities
• A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
• Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching

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