Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
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Publication:1729675
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.010zbMath1419.91275OpenAlexW2908947494MaRDI QIDQ1729675
Eve Ramaekers, Saptarshi Mukherjee, Arunava Sen, Nozomu Muto
Publication date: 28 February 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.010
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Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching, Implementation in strong core by codes of rights, Designing rotation programs: limits and possibilities, Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents, Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
Cites Work
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