Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.12.010MaRDI QIDQ1729675zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Saptarshi Mukherjee, Nozomu Muto, Eve Ramaekers, Arunava Sen

Publication date 28 February 2019

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.010

zbMATH Keywords

bounded mechanismsimplementation in undominated strategiesPareto correspondence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations
• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies

Cites work

• An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. With contributions by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz
• Game theory and mechanism design
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
• Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Pure Strategy Dominance
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games

Cited in

(8)

• Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
• Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
• A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
• Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching
• Designing rotation programs: limits and possibilities

This page was built for publication: Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1729675)