Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped
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Recommendations
- Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped
- Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible
- Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences
- Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences
- Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
Cites work
- Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain
- Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
- Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
- Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
- Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
- Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
- Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
- Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies when Preferences are Single-Dipped with Best Indifferent Allocations
- Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences
- On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences
- Population-monotonicity and separability for economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
- Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences
- Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity
- Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped
- Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped
- Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc
- Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model
- Strategy-proof location of public bads in an interval
- Strategy-proof location of public facilities
- Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
- Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible
- Where should your daughter go to college? An axiomatic analysis
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