Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2023.111293MaRDI QIDQ6047396zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bas Dietzenbacher, Yuki Tamura

Publication date 12 September 2023

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111293

zbMATH Keywords

corePareto optimalitysingle-dipped preferencesresource reallocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences
• Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped
• Population-monotonicity and separability for economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
• Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1440128

Cites work

• Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
• Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences
• Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
• Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
• Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences
• Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies when Preferences are Single-Dipped with Best Indifferent Allocations
• Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
• Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences
• Population-monotonicity and separability for economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
• Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences
• Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good
• Single-peaked preferences, endowments and population-monotonicity.
• Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped
• Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments
• Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible

Cited in

(7)

• Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued.
• Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences
• Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
• Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped
• Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
• Strategyproof and fair allocation of a perfectly divisible private commodity with (restricted) single-dipped preferences
• Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences

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