Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences

DOI10.1007/S003550100114MaRDI QIDQ2567916zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lars Ehlers

Publication date 14 October 2005

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100114

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Search theory (90B40) Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules
• Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped
• Population-monotonicity and separability for economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
• Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible
• Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule

Cited in

(21)

• Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped
• On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference
• Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued.
• Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules
• Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
• On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences
• Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
• Single-basined choice
• Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
• The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints
• Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
• On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
• Population-monotonicity and separability for economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
• Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped
• Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible
• Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences
• Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
• Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped
• Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences
• On (constrained) efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment
• Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation

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