Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
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Publication:2491082
DOI10.1007/s00182-005-0002-5zbMath1151.91664OpenAlexW2158365491MaRDI QIDQ2491082
Publication date: 26 May 2006
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0002-5
Related Items (21)
Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice ⋮ A new solution concept for the roommate problem: \(\mathcal{Q}\)-stable matchings ⋮ New axioms for deferred acceptance ⋮ Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities ⋮ Consistent enlargements of the core in roommate problems ⋮ An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm ⋮ Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems ⋮ Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems ⋮ Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution ⋮ An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems ⋮ Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets ⋮ Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems ⋮ Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets ⋮ Consistency and its converse for roommate markets ⋮ Impossibilities for roommate problems ⋮ An impossibility theorem for matching problems ⋮ Social integration in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Monotonic core allocation paths for assignment games ⋮ Consistency and its converse: an introduction ⋮ Matching with restricted trade ⋮ Axiomatization of the core of assignment games
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