Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models

DOI10.1016/S0012-365X(99)00260-5MaRDI QIDQ1978178zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Kimmo Eriksson, Johan Karlander

Publication date 2000

Published in Discrete Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/math/9801096

zbMATH Keywords

MatchingLatticeCoreStable matchingOptimal matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorial games (91A46) Matching models (91B68)

Abstract: In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage model (where no money is involved) and the assignment model (where payments are involved). Roth and Sotomayor (1990) asked for an explanation for the similarities in behavior between those two models. We address this question by introducing a common generalization that preserves the two important features: the existence of a stable outcome and the lattice property of the set of stable outcomes.

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