A Note on a Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market with Possibly Bounded Salaries

DOI10.1142/S0219198917500177zbMath1415.91213OpenAlexW2723712516MaRDI QIDQ4593828

Ayesha Mahmood, Rashid Farooq

Publication date: 15 November 2017

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198917500177

zbMATH Keywords

stable matchingdiscrete convex analysisassignment modelmarriage model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear programming (90C05) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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