Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.12.001zbMath1134.91518OpenAlexW2040722641MaRDI QIDQ926792

Marilda Sotomayor

Publication date: 21 May 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

corecomparative staticsstable matchingfirm-optimal stable outcomeworker-optimal stable outcome

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory ⋮ Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game ⋮ Two-Sided Matching Models

Cites Work

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