Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.01.004MaRDI QIDQ1735807zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David Pérez-Castrillo, Marilda Sotomayor

Publication date 29 March 2019

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.004

zbMATH Keywords

matchingstabilitycompetitive equilibriumcomparative statics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• A note on the multiple partners assignment game
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3702355 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3185418 (Why is no real title available?)
• A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers
• Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game
• Comparative statics in matching markets
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• Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market
• Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The central assignment game and the assignment markets
• The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem

Cited in

(9)

• A note on the multiple partners assignment game
• Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
• An ordinal game theory approach to the analysis and selection of partners in public-private partnership projects
• Does it make sense to analyse a two-sided market as a multi-choice game?
• Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games
• Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game
• Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market
• The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria
• Comparative statics of assignment markets with general utilities

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