Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game
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Publication:532699
DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0171-8zbMath1211.91181MaRDI QIDQ532699
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0171-8
91B68: Matching models
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