Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game

DOI10.1007/S00182-009-0171-8zbMath1211.91181OpenAlexW2105558692MaRDI QIDQ532699

Marilda Sotomayor

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0171-8

zbMATH Keywords

latticematchingcompetitive equilibrium payoffstable payoff

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (9)

Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game ⋮ Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept ⋮ The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria ⋮ On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory ⋮ A survey on assignment markets ⋮ Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game ⋮ Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games ⋮ Competition and cooperation in a two-sided matching market with replication ⋮ Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market

Cites Work

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• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
• A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers
• The English auction with differentiated commodities
• A simple selling and buying procedure
• The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
• Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• On Representatives of Subsets
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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