A simple selling and buying procedure

DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2783zbMath1010.91080OpenAlexW2039274946MaRDI QIDQ1601457

Marilda Sotomayor, David Pérez-Castrillo

Publication date: 26 June 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2783

zbMATH Keywords

implementationmechanismmatching modelassignment model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically ⋮ Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game ⋮ On the set of extreme core allocations for minimal cost spanning tree problems ⋮ On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory ⋮ A survey on assignment markets ⋮ Implementation in the many-to-many matching market. ⋮ Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers ⋮ Two-Sided Matching Models ⋮ A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes ⋮ Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market ⋮ Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game ⋮ Nash equilibria in a model of multiproduct price competition: an assignment problem ⋮ Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
• Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
• Cooperative outcomes through noncooperative games
• Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
• Non-cooperative matching games
• A market to implement the core
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage