Organizational refinements of Nash equilibrium

DOI10.1007/S11238-021-09812-5MaRDI QIDQ2243535zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Takashi Kamihigashi, Kerim Keskin, Çağrı Sağlam

Publication date 11 November 2021

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11693/77272

zbMATH Keywords

coalitional structuregames with strategic complementaritiesNash equilibriumorganizational structurerefinements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

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Cites work

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• A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium
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• The set of Nash equilibria of a supermodular game is a complete lattice
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Cited in

(2)

• Dynamic coordination via organizational routines
• Institutional enforceability

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