Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy
From MaRDI portal
Publication:412085
DOI10.1007/s00199-011-0628-4zbMath1277.91150MaRDI QIDQ412085
Alexander V. Hirsch, David P. Baron
Publication date: 3 May 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/95190/
91F10: History, political science
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Introduction to the symposium in political economy, A spatial theory of party formation, Lobbying and discretion, A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy, On the spatial representation of preference profiles
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