Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy
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Recommendations
Cites work
- A Structural Model of Government Formation
- A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy
- Common Agency
- Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems
- Lobbying and discretion
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework
- Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games
- The dynamics of distributive politics
- The formateurs' role in government formation
Cited in
(12)- Lobbying and elections
- Uncertainty-driven symmetry-breaking and stochastic stability in a generic differential game of lobbying
- Policy bias equivalence under common agency
- A spatial theory of party formation
- Introduction to the symposium in political economy
- Lobbying and discretion
- A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy
- Policy influence and private returns from lobbying in the energy sector
- Lobbying as a multidimensional tug of war
- Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
- On the spatial representation of preference profiles
- Multimarket lobbying with reserves
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