Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy

DOI10.1007/S00199-011-0628-4zbMATH Open1277.91150OpenAlexW2168745364MaRDI QIDQ412085FDOQ412085

Alexander V. Hirsch, David P. Baron

Publication date: 3 May 2012

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/95190/

Recommendations

• Lobbying as a multidimensional tug of war
• Policy bias equivalence under common agency
• Lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy
• Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
• Lobbying and policy extremism in repeated elections

zbMATH Keywords

public policycommon agencygridlocklobbyingproto-coalitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

• A Structural Model of Government Formation
• Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games
• Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• The dynamics of distributive politics
• A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy
• Common Agency
• Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework
• Lobbying and discretion
• The formateurs' role in government formation

Cited In (8)

• Uncertainty-driven symmetry-breaking and stochastic stability in a generic differential game of lobbying
• A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy
• A spatial theory of party formation
• Introduction to the symposium in political economy
• Lobbying and discretion
• Policy bias equivalence under common agency
• Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
• On the spatial representation of preference profiles

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