Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy

DOI10.1007/S00199-011-0628-4MaRDI QIDQ412085zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David P. Baron, Alexander V. Hirsch

Publication date 3 May 2012

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://authors.library.caltech.edu/95190/

zbMATH Keywords

public policycommon agencygridlocklobbyingproto-coalitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10)

Recommendations

• Lobbying as a multidimensional tug of war
• Policy bias equivalence under common agency
• Lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy
• Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
• Lobbying and policy extremism in repeated elections

Cites work

• A Structural Model of Government Formation
• A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy
• Common Agency
• Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems
• Lobbying and discretion
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework
• Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games
• The dynamics of distributive politics
• The formateurs' role in government formation

Cited in

(12)

• Lobbying and elections
• Uncertainty-driven symmetry-breaking and stochastic stability in a generic differential game of lobbying
• Policy bias equivalence under common agency
• A spatial theory of party formation
• Introduction to the symposium in political economy
• Lobbying and discretion
• A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy
• Policy influence and private returns from lobbying in the energy sector
• Lobbying as a multidimensional tug of war
• Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
• On the spatial representation of preference profiles
• Multimarket lobbying with reserves

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