Uncertainty-driven symmetry-breaking and stochastic stability in a generic differential game of lobbying

DOI10.1007/S00199-021-01403-3MaRDI QIDQ6579446zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors R. Boucekkine, Fabien Prieur, Wei H. Ruan, Benteng Zou

Publication date 25 July 2024

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic differential gamesstochastic stabilitypolitical lobbyingsocial cost of lobbyingsymmetric versus asymmetric equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Stochastic stability in control theory (93E15)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 52448 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1734466 (Why is no real title available?)
• An Asymptotic Theory of Growth Under Uncertainty
• Climate politics: how public persuasion affects the trade-off between environmental and economic performance
• Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy
• Continuous stochastic games of capital accumulation with convex transitions
• Dynamic rent-seeking games
• Industry Structure and Cost-Reducing Investment
• Lobbying and discretion
• Mean growth and stochastic stability in endogenous growth models
• Racing with Uncertainty
• Stochastic differential game model of a common property fishery
• Strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly
• Symmetric versus asymmetric equilibria in symmetric supermodular games
• Symmetry-breaking in two-player games via strategic substitutes and diagonal nonconcavity: a synthesis

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(1)

• Sunk costs, entry and clustering

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