Lobbying and discretion

DOI10.1007/S00199-011-0634-6zbMATH Open1277.91154OpenAlexW1995601429MaRDI QIDQ412093FDOQ412093

S. Jordan, Adam Meirowitz

Publication date: 3 May 2012

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0634-6

Recommendations

• Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
• Lobbying as a multidimensional tug of war
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• Lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy
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zbMATH Keywords

contestdiscretionagency theorylobbying

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Contest success functions
• Multi-battle contests
• Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy

Cited In (10)

• Uncertainty-driven symmetry-breaking and stochastic stability in a generic differential game of lobbying
• Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy
• Introduction to the symposium in political economy
• Transparency and special interests
• Legislative informational lobbying
• Lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy
• The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities
• Sequential legislative lobbying
• A restriction on lobbyist donations
• Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure

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