Lobbying and discretion

DOI10.1007/S00199-011-0634-6MaRDI QIDQ412093zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors S. Jordan, Adam Meirowitz

Publication date 3 May 2012

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0634-6

zbMATH Keywords

contestdiscretionagency theorylobbying

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10)

Recommendations

• Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
• Lobbying as a multidimensional tug of war
• Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy
• Lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy
• Legislative informational lobbying

Cites work

• Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy
• Contest success functions
• Multi-battle contests
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• The all-pay auction with complete information

Cited in

(12)

• Spending-biased legislators: discipline through disagreement
• Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure
• A restriction on lobbyist donations
• Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda
• Uncertainty-driven symmetry-breaking and stochastic stability in a generic differential game of lobbying
• Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy
• Introduction to the symposium in political economy
• Legislative informational lobbying
• Sequential legislative lobbying
• Transparency and special interests
• Lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy
• The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities

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