Policy bias equivalence under common agency

DOI10.1007/S00712-006-0239-XMaRDI QIDQ2642564zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mike Felgenhauer

Publication date 17 August 2007

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-006-0239-x

zbMATH Keywords

common agencycommon valuelobbying

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) History, political science (91F10)

Recommendations

• Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy
• Lobbying as a multidimensional tug of war
• Citizens or lobbies: who controls policy?
• Optimal lobbying pricing
• Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction

Cites work

• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• Lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

Cited in

(6)

• Optimal lobbying pricing
• Prejudice, bias and identity neutral policy
• Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction
• Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy
• Revealed political power
• Industry input in policy making: evidence from medicare

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