Endogenous market regulation in a signaling model of lobby formation

DOI10.1007/S00712-017-0547-3MaRDI QIDQ1652811zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Francisco Candel-Sánchez, Juan Perote-Peña

Publication date 16 July 2018

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0547-3

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationsignalinglobby formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Information transmission and inefficient lobbying
• Endogeneous Protection, Factor Returns and Resource Allocation
• Lobbying competition over trade policy
• Lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy
• Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote

Cites work

• Common Agency
• Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure
• Sequential Equilibria
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

Cited in

(7)

• Industry input in policy making: evidence from medicare
• Endogeneous Protection, Factor Returns and Resource Allocation
• Lobbying competition over trade policy
• Follow the money
• Productivity growth and welfare in a model of allocative inefficiency
• Trade associations: why not cartels?
• Information transmission and inefficient lobbying

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