Endogeneous Protection, Factor Returns and Resource Allocation

DOI10.2307/2297636MaRDI QIDQ3734129zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Leslie Young, Stephen P. Magee

Publication date 1986

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2297636

zbMATH Keywords

resource allocationpolitical economicsendogeneous protectionfactor returnsHeckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson trade modeltwo lobbiestwo political parties

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multisectoral models in economics (91B66)

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