Lobbying competition over trade policy

DOI10.1111/J.1468-2354.2011.00673.XMaRDI QIDQ4619977zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kishore Gawande, Pravin Krishna, Marcelo Olarreaga

Publication date 7 February 2019

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00673.x

zbMATH Keywords

trade policylobbyingGrossman-Helpman modelwelfare-mindedness of governments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60)

Recommendations

• Endogeneous Protection, Factor Returns and Resource Allocation
• Lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy
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• Lobbying as a multidimensional tug of war
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Cited in

(5)

• Identity politics and trade policy
• Endogeneous Protection, Factor Returns and Resource Allocation
• Endogenous market regulation in a signaling model of lobby formation
• Choked by red tape? The political economy of wasteful trade barriers
• Trade associations: why not cartels?

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