Principal-agent theory, game theory, and the precautionary principle
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5118434
Recommendations
- Risk management in hierarchical games with random factors
- The principal-agent problem with evolutionary learning
- Decision-making under scientific uncertainty: The economics of the precautionary principle
- The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
- The game theory analysis on principle-agent problems of fund investment
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5666287 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5200101 (Why is no real title available?)
- Active vs. passive defense against a strategic attacker
- Common Agency
- Decision-making under scientific uncertainty: The economics of the precautionary principle
- Endogenizing the sticks and carrots: modeling possible perverse effects of counterterrorism measures
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Governments' and terrorists' defense and attack in a \(T\)-period game
- Long-sighted principal and myopic agents
- Measurable Multiattribute Value Functions
- Measuring Effort
- Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
- Repeated Moral Hazard
- Risk assessment and risk management: review of recent advances on their foundation
- TAKING EFFORT SERIOUSLY: A REPLY TO CURRIE AND STEEDMAN
- The Ordinality of Effort Revisited
Cited in
(3)
This page was built for publication: Principal-agent theory, game theory, and the precautionary principle
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5118434)
