Principal-agent theory, game theory, and the precautionary principle
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Publication:5118434
DOI10.1287/DECA.2018.0380OpenAlexW2942738779MaRDI QIDQ5118434FDOQ5118434
Authors: Kjell Hausken 
Publication date: 8 September 2020
Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2018.0380
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Cites Work
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- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
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- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Measurable Multiattribute Value Functions
- Risk assessment and risk management: review of recent advances on their foundation
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
- Repeated Moral Hazard
- Common Agency
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- Endogenizing the sticks and carrots: modeling possible perverse effects of counterterrorism measures
- Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard
- Active vs. passive defense against a strategic attacker
- Measuring Effort
- Long-sighted principal and myopic agents
- The Ordinality of Effort Revisited
- TAKING EFFORT SERIOUSLY: A REPLY TO CURRIE AND STEEDMAN
Cited In (3)
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