Principal–Agent Theory, Game Theory, and the Precautionary Principle
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Publication:5118434
DOI10.1287/deca.2018.0380OpenAlexW2942738779MaRDI QIDQ5118434
Publication date: 8 September 2020
Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2018.0380
Cites Work
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