Principal–Agent Theory, Game Theory, and the Precautionary Principle

DOI10.1287/DECA.2018.0380OpenAlexW2942738779MaRDI QIDQ5118434FDOQ5118434

Kjell Hausken

Publication date: 8 September 2020

Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2018.0380

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintygame theoryriskstrategic interactionformalizationagentsprecautionary principleprincipals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

• Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T-Period Game
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• Risk assessment and risk management: review of recent advances on their foundation
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Repeated Moral Hazard
• Common Agency
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• Endogenizing the sticks and carrots: modeling possible perverse effects of counterterrorism measures
• Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard
• Active vs. passive defense against a strategic attacker
• Measuring Effort
• Long-sighted principal and myopic agents
• The Ordinality of Effort Revisited
• TAKING EFFORT SERIOUSLY: A REPLY TO CURRIE AND STEEDMAN

Cited In (1)

• Decision-making under scientific uncertainty: The economics of the precautionary principle

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