The principal-agent problem with evolutionary learning

DOI10.1007/BF00240424zbMATH Open0873.90148OpenAlexW1977999263MaRDI QIDQ1361918FDOQ1361918

Authors: O. Diekmann 

Publication date: 28 July 1997

Published in: Computational \& Mathematical Organization Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00240424

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zbMATH Keywords

genetic algorithmbounded rationalityincentivesNash equilibriaagency theoryobject-oriented computer simulationprincipal-agent game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Problems related to evolution (92D15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Economics of information (91B44) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

Cited In (8)

• Learning by doing vs. learning from others in a principal-agent model
• Adverse selection, heterogeneous beliefs, and evolutionary learning
• A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information.
• Investment behavior under Knightian uncertainty -- an evolutionary approach
• Principal-agent theory, game theory, and the precautionary principle
• Incentive mechanism design problem based on gradient dynamics
• Crowd computing as a cooperation problem: An evolutionary approach
• A computer simulation and analysis to the principal agent model

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