The principal-agent problem with evolutionary learning

DOI10.1007/BF00240424MaRDI QIDQ1361918zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors O. Diekmann

Publication date 28 July 1997

Published in Computational \& Mathematical Organization Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00240424

zbMATH Keywords

genetic algorithmbounded rationalityincentivesNash equilibriaagency theoryobject-oriented computer simulationprincipal-agent game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Problems related to evolution (92D15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Economics of information (91B44) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

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(8)

• Crowd computing as a cooperation problem: An evolutionary approach
• Investment behavior under Knightian uncertainty -- an evolutionary approach
• A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information.
• Learning by doing vs. learning from others in a principal-agent model
• Incentive mechanism design problem based on gradient dynamics
• Adverse selection, heterogeneous beliefs, and evolutionary learning
• Principal-agent theory, game theory, and the precautionary principle
• A computer simulation and analysis to the principal agent model

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