Analysis of stochastic matching markets
DOI10.1007/S00182-012-0352-8zbMATH Open1279.91120OpenAlexW2024029571MaRDI QIDQ378330FDOQ378330
Authors: Péter Biró, Gethin Norman
Publication date: 11 November 2013
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://real.mtak.hu/7775/7/BN13ijgt_last.pdf
Recommendations
Markov chainmodel checkingstable marriage problemstable roommates problemstochastic matching markets
Applications of Markov chains and discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (social mobility, learning theory, industrial processes, etc.) (60J20) Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
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Cited In (9)
- The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets
- Pricing and investments in matching markets
- Random path to stability in a decentralized market with contracts
- The stochastic stability of decentralized matching on a graph
- On (coalitional) exchange-stable matching
- A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
- Multi-agent reinforcement learning for decentralized stable matching
- Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints
- Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market
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