``Timing is everything and marital bliss
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Publication:1601455
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Cites work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960 (Why is no real title available?)
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
Cited in
(14)- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- Decision making in arranged marriages with a stochastic reservation quality level
- Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints
- Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
- Paths to stable allocations
- The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems
- Sequential entry in one-to-one matching markets
- Analysis of stochastic matching markets
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 592675 (Why is no real title available?)
- Deferred acceptance with compensation chains
- A stochastic dynamic programming approach to decision making in arranged marriages
- The law of large numbers for large stable matchings
- Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
- Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets
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