Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
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Recommendations
- A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
- Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities
- Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
- Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems
- Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem
Cited in
(56)- Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability
- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
- The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets
- Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems
- A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
- Implementation in generalized matching problems
- Games of manipulation in marriage problems
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- ``Timing is everything and marital bliss
- A simple selling and buying procedure
- Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching
- Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.
- Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
- School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms
- Manipulability in school choice
- A stable marriage requires communication
- Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism
- On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
- Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities
- The modified Boston mechanism
- Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
- The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
- Games implementing the stable rule of marriage problems in strong Nash equilibria
- Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms
- Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
- Bargaining and Competition in Matching Markets
- Stable marriages and search frictions
- Let them cheat!
- Two-Sided Matching Models
- Decentralized job matching
- The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation
- A Stable Marriage Requires Communication
- Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games
- Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms
- Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets
- Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students
- Robustness to manipulations in school choice
- A further note on the college admission game
- Non-bossiness
- In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
- Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
- Nash implementation in a many-to-one matching market
- Game-theoretic analysis of decentralized college admissions in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
- Constrained school choice
- A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
- Matching markets under (in)complete information
- Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
- Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
- Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
- Manipulation via capacities revisited
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