Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
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Cites work
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Cited in
(7)- An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
- Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
- Menu mechanisms
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- On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
- In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
- Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
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