A polynomial-time algorithm to find von Neumann-Morgenstern stable matchings in marriage games

DOI10.1007/s00453-010-9388-yzbMath1203.91206MaRDI QIDQ1959733

Jun Wako

Publication date: 7 October 2010

Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-010-9388-y

zbMATH Keywords

matching problem; stable matching; von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

68Q25: Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity

91A46: Combinatorial games

91B68: Matching models

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Cites Work

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• Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
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