Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
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Cites work
- A market to implement the core
- Cooperative outcomes through noncooperative games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation of college admission rules
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
Cited in
(25)- Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability
- The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- A simple selling and buying procedure
- Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching
- Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem
- Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
- Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market
- A market design approach to job rotation
- The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically
- One-to-many non-cooperative matching games
- The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Profit-maximizing matchmaker
- Two-Sided Matching Models
- Decentralized job matching
- Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
- Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games
- Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets
- Sequential school choice with public and private schools
- Game-theoretic analysis of decentralized college admissions in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
- A generalized assignment game
- Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries
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