Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.
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In a self-relevant mechanism, each agent announces only his own preference together with an outcome and an agent index. In this paper, the author examines implementability of well-known social choice correspondences by self-relevant mechanisms and reviews some previous results in the Nash implementation problem from the view point of self-relevancy or informational decentralization on mechanisms.
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Cites work
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3215724 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems
- Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- Toward Natural Implementation
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