Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00037-9MaRDI QIDQ1867848zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Yoshikatsu Tatamitani

Publication date 2 April 2003

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms
• Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
• Toward Natural Implementation
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3215724 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems
• Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Nash implementation of matching rules
• On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• Toward Natural Implementation

Cited in

(2)

• Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
• Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms

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