Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets
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Publication:2201710
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.05.010zbMATH Open1448.91184OpenAlexW3047307356MaRDI QIDQ2201710FDOQ2201710
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Cites Work
- Choice functions over a finite set: A summary
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- Full substitutability
- General theory of best variants choice: Some aspects
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
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