Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4172789 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4137493 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4089320 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Double-Track Adjustment Process for Discrete Markets With Substitutes and Complements
- A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
- A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
- Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
- Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
- Cores of partitioning games
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Endogenous formation of cooperation structures
- Equilibria and Indivisibilities: Gross Substitutes and Complements
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for balancedness in partitioning games
- On cores and indivisibility
- On the existence of stable roommate matchings
- Stable outcomes of the roommate game with transferable utility
- The English auction with differentiated commodities
- The assignment game. I: The core
- The existence and computation of competitive equilibria in markets with an indivisible commodity
- Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
Cited in
(12)- Strong coalitional equilibrium in a transportation game
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2131728 (Why is no real title available?)
- Strong coalitional structure in an open vehicle routing game
- A competitive partnership formation process
- Partnership formation and binomial semivalues
- Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core
- An exploration in school formation: income vs. ability
- When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships
- A method for finding the maximal set in excess demand
- Partnership formation and multinomial values
- Gross substitutes and complements: a simple generalization
- Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market
This page was built for publication: A model of partnership formation
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q553531)
