A model of partnership formation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:553531
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2011.02.003zbMATH Open1217.91127OpenAlexW3121899422MaRDI QIDQ553531FDOQ553531
Publication date: 27 July 2011
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/en/publications/a-model-of-partnership-formation(69e159c9-1700-49f0-ad7f-f863a9d12590).html
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The assignment game. I: The core
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
- A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
- Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
- Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
- On cores and indivisibility
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Equilibria and Indivisibilities: Gross Substitutes and Complements
- A Double-Track Adjustment Process for Discrete Markets With Substitutes and Complements
- A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
- Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
- Cores of partitioning games
- The English auction with differentiated commodities
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for balancedness in partitioning games
- On the existence of stable roommate matchings
- Stable outcomes of the roommate game with transferable utility
- The existence and computation of competitive equilibria in markets with an indivisible commodity
- Endogenous formation of cooperation structures
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (12)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Strong coalitional equilibrium in a transportation game
- A competitive partnership formation process
- Partnership formation and binomial semivalues
- Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core
- An exploration in school formation: income vs. ability
- Strong Coalitional Structure in an Open Vehicle Routing Game
- When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships
- A method for finding the maximal set in excess demand
- Partnership formation and multinomial values
- Gross substitutes and complements: a simple generalization
- Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market
This page was built for publication: A model of partnership formation
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q553531)
