Stable outcomes of the roommate game with transferable utility

DOI10.1007/s001820000058zbMath1060.91037OpenAlexW2043271871MaRDI QIDQ1414374

Kimmo Eriksson, Johan Karlander

Publication date: 20 November 2003

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000058

zbMATH Keywords

coretransferable utilityforbidden minorsroommate problempartitioning game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Combinatorial games (91A46)

Related Items (15)

Population monotonicity in matching games ⋮ The stable fixtures problem with payments ⋮ Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems ⋮ Stable sharing ⋮ Consistency in one-sided assignment problems ⋮ Solutions for the stable roommates problem with payments ⋮ Computing solutions for matching games ⋮ Efficient stabilization of cooperative matching games ⋮ A model of partnership formation ⋮ A competitive partnership formation process ⋮ Graph Stabilization: A Survey ⋮ Coalitional games induced by matching problems: complexity and islands of tractability for the Shapley value ⋮ Computing the nucleolus of weighted cooperative matching games in polynomial time ⋮ The Stable Fixtures Problem with Payments ⋮ The general graph matching game: approximate core

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