Population monotonicity in matching games
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Publication:2136163
DOI10.1007/s10878-021-00804-3zbMath1492.91035arXiv2105.00621OpenAlexW3201170906MaRDI QIDQ2136163
Publication date: 10 May 2022
Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.00621
Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Games on graphs (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C57)
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Cites Work
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