Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.02.004MaRDI QIDQ2482920zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Herbert Dawid, W. Bentley MacLeod

Publication date 28 April 2008

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.02.004

zbMATH Keywords

evolution of normsfair divisioninvestmentstochastic stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

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Cites work

• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
• Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
• Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
• Holdup and the evolution of bargaining conventions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3826915 (Why is no real title available?)
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
• Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach

Cited in

(8)

• Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time
• Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market
• Holdup and the evolution of bargaining conventions
• Evolutionary game theory
• Evolution, investment, and bargaining
• Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach
• Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
• How robust is the equal split norm? Responsive strategies, selection mechanisms and the need for economic interpretation of simulation parameters

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