Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?

DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0891MaRDI QIDQ700125zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tore Ellingsen, Jack Robles

Publication date 30 September 2002

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/1525.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionhold-up problemspecific investments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Recommendations

• Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms
• Holdup and the evolution of bargaining conventions
• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• A dynamic theory of holdup.
• Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem

Cites work

• A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
• Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit
• An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model
• Conventional Contracts
• Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
• Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games
• Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Stochastic stability in games with alternative best replies
• The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts

Cited in

(16)

• Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach
• Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time
• A dynamic game model for a class of venture investment behaviors
• Evolution, investment, and bargaining
• Evolution in finitely repeated coordination games
• The evolution of parental investment: re-examining the anisogamy argument
• A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.
• A dynamic theory of holdup.
• On efficient firm formation
• Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem
• Property rights and investments: an evolutionary approach
• How robust is the equal split norm? Responsive strategies, selection mechanisms and the need for economic interpretation of simulation parameters
• Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms
• Evolutionary game theory
• Holdup and the evolution of bargaining conventions
• Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences

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