Conventional Contracts
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(24)- Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.
- Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: equality without symmetry
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule
- Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time
- Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games
- Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining
- Robust stochastic stability
- Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences
- Stochastically stable equilibria in n-person binary coordination games
- Coalitional stochastic stability
- Runs, panics and bubbles: Diamond-Dybvig and Morris-Shin reconsidered
- Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures
- Evolutionary game theory
- An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics
- Evolutionarily rational mutations in structured populations
- Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play
- Imitation with asymmetric memory
- Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games
- Conventions in large games with randomly drawn payoffs
- Memory retrieval in the demand game with a few possible splits: unfair conventions emerge in fair settings
- Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
- Information, interaction and memory
- Contract adjustment under uncertainty
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