Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2010.07.005zbMath1202.91121MaRDI QIDQ613418

Samuel Bowles, Sung-Ha Hwang, Suresh Naidu

Publication date: 20 December 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.07.005

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibria; stochastic stability; Nash bargaining solution; intentionality; idiosyncratic play

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91A22: Evolutionary games

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Cites Work

• Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.
• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities.
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Conventional Contracts
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions