Runs, panics and bubbles: Diamond-Dybvig and Morris-Shin reconsidered
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1239549 (Why is no real title available?)
- Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
- Conventional Contracts
- Dynamics of Bayesian updating with dependent data and misspecified models
- Endogenizing the provision of money: costs of commodity and fiat monies in relation to the value of trade
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Evolutionary game dynamics
- Game theory
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- Remarks on infinitely repeated extensive-form games
- Symmetry and Collective Fluctuations in Evolutionary Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
- The logic of animal conflict
Cited in
(7)- Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures
- LEARNING AND IMITATION: TRANSITIONAL DYNAMICS IN VARIANTS OF THE BAM
- The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model
- The Paradox of Thrift, Liquidity Preference and Animal Spirits
- A model of financial fragility
- Bank runs as a coordination problem within a two-bank set-up: who will survive?
- Economic growth, liquidity, and bank runs
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