Stable marriages and search frictions
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Publication:402071
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2013.11.001zbMATH Open1296.91209OpenAlexW2144864945MaRDI QIDQ402071FDOQ402071
Authors: Stephan Lauermann, Georg Nöldeke 
Publication date: 27 August 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://edoc.unibas.ch/36240/5/PUBL_Lauermann_Noeldeke_2014_Stable_marriages_ext.pdf
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Assortative Matching and Search
- Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The revealed preference theory of stable and extremal stable matchings
- Marriage and Class
- Linear programming brings marital bliss
- Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
- Characterization of stable matchings as extreme points of a polytope
- A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility.
- On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games
- The job search problem as an employer–candidate game
Cited In (8)
- The structure of stable marriage with indifference
- ``Timing is everything and marital bliss
- A college admissions clearinghouse
- A Large Population Partnership Formation Game with Associative Preferences and Continuous Time
- A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
- Dynamically stable matching
- Existence of steady-state equilibria in matching models with search frictions
- Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets
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