Markov equilibria in a model of bargaining in networks

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.09.004MaRDI QIDQ417659zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dilip Abreu, Mihai Manea

Publication date 14 May 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/98852

zbMATH Keywords

inefficiencynetworksbargainingMarkov perfect equilibriumequilibrium existencedecentralized marketsrandom matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Bargaining and efficiency in networks
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• Multilateral bargaining in networks: on the prevalence of inefficiencies
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Cites work

• A strategic model of social and economic networks
• Bargaining and efficiency in networks
• Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers.
• Bilateral bargaining in networks
• Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
• Endogenous Two-Sided Markets with Repeated Transactions
• Game theory
• Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
• Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions
• Matching and Bargaining in Dynamic Markets
• Social and economic networks.
• Stochastic games

Cited in

(22)

• Bargaining in dynamic markets
• A discrete model of market interaction in the presence of social networks and price discrimination
• Bargaining power in communication networks
• On the Role of a Market Maker in Networked Cournot Competition
• Bargaining and efficiency in networks
• Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games
• Setting Nash versus Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining approach: computing the continuous-time controllable Markov game
• A bargaining game model for measuring performance of two-stage network structures
• Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining
• Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players
• Trading networks of price-taking buyers and sellers
• Market networks: the core
• Networks, frictions, and price dispersion
• Price dispersion in stationary networked markets
• Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks
• Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks
• Bargaining in small dynamic markets
• Matching structure and bargaining outcomes in buyer-seller networks
• The Markovian strategies and the effectiveness of multilaterial bargaining
• Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games
• Multilateral bargaining in networks: on the prevalence of inefficiencies
• Bargaining and exclusion with multiple buyers

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