Markov equilibria in a model of bargaining in networks

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.004zbMath1279.91076OpenAlexW2152547286MaRDI QIDQ417659

Mihai Manea, Dilip Abreu

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/98852

zbMATH Keywords

networksbargainingMarkov perfect equilibriumequilibrium existenceinefficiencydecentralized marketsrandom matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (11)

Matching structure and bargaining outcomes in buyer-seller networks ⋮ Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks ⋮ Price dispersion in stationary networked markets ⋮ Bargaining in small dynamic markets ⋮ Networks, frictions, and price dispersion ⋮ Setting Nash Versus Kalai–Smorodinsky Bargaining Approach: Computing the Continuous-Time Controllable Markov Game ⋮ Bargaining and efficiency in networks ⋮ Trading networks of price-taking buyers and sellers ⋮ Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks ⋮ Bargaining in dynamic markets ⋮ Multilateral Bargaining in Networks: On the Prevalence of Inefficiencies

Cites Work

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• Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
• Endogenous Two-Sided Markets with Repeated Transactions
• Matching and Bargaining in Dynamic Markets
• Stochastic games
• Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions

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