Markov equilibria in a model of bargaining in networks
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.09.004zbMATH Open1279.91076OpenAlexW2152547286MaRDI QIDQ417659FDOQ417659
Authors: Dilip Abreu, Mihai Manea 
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/98852
Recommendations
inefficiencynetworksbargainingMarkov perfect equilibriumequilibrium existencedecentralized marketsrandom matching
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Cites Work
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- Game theory
- Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
- Social and economic networks.
- Stochastic games
- Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions
- Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers.
- Bilateral bargaining in networks
- Bargaining and efficiency in networks
- Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
- Matching and Bargaining in Dynamic Markets
- Endogenous Two-Sided Markets with Repeated Transactions
Cited In (22)
- A discrete model of market interaction in the presence of social networks and price discrimination
- Bargaining power in communication networks
- On the Role of a Market Maker in Networked Cournot Competition
- Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games
- Bargaining and efficiency in networks
- Setting Nash versus Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining approach: computing the continuous-time controllable Markov game
- A bargaining game model for measuring performance of two-stage network structures
- Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining
- Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players
- Trading networks of price-taking buyers and sellers
- Market networks: the core
- Networks, frictions, and price dispersion
- Price dispersion in stationary networked markets
- Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks
- Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks
- Bargaining in small dynamic markets
- Matching structure and bargaining outcomes in buyer-seller networks
- The Markovian strategies and the effectiveness of multilaterial bargaining
- Multilateral bargaining in networks: on the prevalence of inefficiencies
- Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games
- Bargaining and exclusion with multiple buyers
- Bargaining in dynamic markets
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