Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining
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Publication:1411096
DOI10.1007/s001990200330zbMath1098.91011MaRDI QIDQ1411096
Publication date: 16 October 2003
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990200330
91A12: Cooperative games
91A05: 2-person games
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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