Contracts, firm dynamics, and aggregate productivity
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Publication:2246767
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2021.104190zbMath1475.91152OpenAlexW3126970492MaRDI QIDQ2246767
David Perez-Reyna, Bernabe Lopez-Martin
Publication date: 16 November 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://si2.bcentral.cl/public/pdf/documentos-trabajo/pdf/dtbc910.pdf
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)
Cites Work
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- Why Doesn't Technology Flow From Rich to Poor Countries?
- A Theory of the Firm with Non-binding Employment Contracts
- Managerial Delegation, Law Enforcement, and Aggregate Productivity
- Misallocation in the Market for Inputs: Enforcement and the Organization of Production*
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- Institutional Quality and International Trade
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