Bargaining and exclusion with multiple buyers

DOI10.3982/ECTA19675MaRDI QIDQ6536807zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Dilip Abreu, Mihai Manea

Publication date 14 May 2024

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA19675

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Externalities in a bargaining model of public price announcements and resale
• Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers
• Efficient Sequential Bargaining
• Price skimming: commitment and delay in bargaining with outside option
• Equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining and random outside options

Cites work

• A foundation for Markov equilibria in sequential games with finite social memory
• A strategic model of social and economic networks
• Bargaining and efficiency in networks
• Bargaining and exclusion with multiple buyers
• Bottleneck links, essential intermediaries, and competing paths of diffusion in networks
• Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core
• Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
• Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts
• Markov equilibria in a model of bargaining in networks
• Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions
• Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Price dispersion in stationary networked markets
• The bargaining problem

Cited in

(3)

• Bargaining and exclusion with multiple buyers
• Bargaining foundations for the outside option principle
• On licensing sequential cost-reducing innovations

This page was built for publication: Bargaining and exclusion with multiple buyers

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6536807)