Stable coalition structures with a unidimensional set of alternatives (Q1802035)

The paper deals with a general model of society which is defined by a profile of individual preferences, given by utility functions over the set of alternatives, and a function of feasibility constraints which determines the expectatives of any coalition. The goal is the study of coalition formation and, especially, the question of stability. A motion of equilibrium is then defined which shares free mobility for players (as in the Nash equilibrium) and free entry for coalitions (as in the core). The main theorem states, in the case, where the set of players or the set of alternatives is finite, the existence of such an equilibrium under three additional hypothesis: unidimensionality and compactness of the set of alternatives, monotonicity of the feasibility function and single-peakedness of the utility functions. When the number of individuals is finite, the set of payoffs which results from these equilibria is shown to lie between the strit coalition struture core and the coalition structure core of a coalitional form game without side payments associated with the model. It is also shown that the set of equilibria is in one-to-one correspondence with both the set of strong Nash equilibria and the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria of the noncooperative game of coalition formation. By introducing further conditions, i.e., assuming the feasibility function is simple and the set of utility functions is equicontinuous, and replacing the notion of equilibrium by a weaker idea of \(\varepsilon\)-equilibrium, the main theorem is extended to the case where the set of players and the set of alternatives are infinite, proving the existence of an \(\varepsilon\)-equilibrium for every \(\varepsilon>0\).