Stable partitions in a model with group-dependent feasible sets

DOI10.1007/S00199-004-0494-4MaRDI QIDQ1780165zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber

Publication date 7 June 2005

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/2003/stable_partitions.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Feasible setsIncreasing and decreasing returnsPositive externalityStable partitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(9)

• Stability and segregation in group formation
• Constitutions and groups
• Formation of segregated and integrated groups
• Paths to stability for overlapping group structures
• Stable unions
• Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games
• Values for Markovian coalition processes
• Citizen preferences and the architecture of government
• Computing the strong \(L_p\)-Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games: convergence and uniqueness

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