Paths to stability for overlapping group structures

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2019.04.005MaRDI QIDQ2425187zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ana Mauleon, Nils Roehl, Vincent Vannetelbosch

Publication date 26 June 2019

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.04.005

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityblocking powerconstitutionsoverlapping group structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

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• Handbook of game theory. Vol. 4
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
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• On the accessibility of the core
• On the existence of stable roommate matchings
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• Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
• Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
• Stable and efficient coalitional networks
• Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance
• The coalition structure core is accessible
• The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures

Cited in

(2)

• Constitutions and groups
• Network formation with myopic and farsighted players

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