Paths to stability for overlapping group structures

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2019.04.005zbMATH Open1417.91056OpenAlexW2936952462MaRDI QIDQ2425187FDOQ2425187

Vincent Vannetelbosch, Ana Mauleon, Nils Roehl

Publication date: 26 June 2019

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.04.005

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zbMATH Keywords

stabilityblocking powerconstitutionsoverlapping group structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
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• The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks
• Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes
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• On the existence of stable roommate matchings
• Contractually stable networks
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• On the accessibility of core-extensions
• Constitutions and groups
• Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance

Cited In (1)

• Network formation with myopic and farsighted players

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