The coalition structure core is accessible

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2003.06.006MaRDI QIDQ705946zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors László Á. Kóczy, Luc Lauwers

Publication date 16 February 2005

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/802612/guid-79a81e0e-ddaf-4909-b692-bd8e3fc49255-ASSET1.0.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Coalition structureCore-extensionDominanceNon-emptiness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core
• Accessible outcomes versus absorbing outcomes
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4018813
• On the accessibility of the core
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Cites work

• A Dynamic Theory for the Class of Games with Nonempty Cores
• A property of the core
• Coalitions, agreements and efficiency
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226100 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3257031 (Why is no real title available?)
• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
• The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process
• Viable Proposals

Cited in

(25)

• The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
• Stable coalition structures in symmetric majority games: a coincidence between myopia and farsightedness
• Consistency and the core in games with externalities
• The projective core of symmetric games with externalities
• The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games
• Population monotonic allocation schemes for games with externalities
• Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance
• Paths to stability for overlapping group structures
• Solutions for the stable roommates problem with payments
• The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
• A coalition-structure's generation method for solving cooperative computing problems in edge computing environments
• Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem
• Multicoalitional solutions
• Axiomatizing core extensions on NTU games
• Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core
• Analysis of stochastic matching markets
• The myopic stable set for social environments
• Accessible outcomes versus absorbing outcomes
• A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games
• Minimal enforceability and indirect domination relations in the Shapley-Scarf economy
• Two solutions on TU games with preference relations: the core and the globally stable solution
• On the characterizations of viable proposals
• The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks
• A general characterization for non-balanced games in terms of \(U\)-cycles
• On the accessibility of the core

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